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Systems mapping workshops have been applied to the problem of medication errors in healthcare. The
workshops were designed using experiential group work principles. They involved a range of stake-
holders fromwithin the health service as well as those who supply the health sector, including designers
who may be able to enhance the safety of products and systems used in healthcare. Research has shown
that the method encourages stakeholder participation, provides robust results within a limited time and
enhances understanding across specialist interest groups. Additional, creative design workshops that
considered the same topic showed signiﬁcant promise in developing concepts from which potential
solutions could be developed further.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Mapping workshops are one example of a method that ergon-
omists can use to help generate a knowledge base for better design
requirements (Buckle et al., 2006). The opportunity for using these
methods to study patient safety issues arose as a result of a scoping
study undertaken on behalf of the Department of Health and the
Design Council in the UK (Buckle et al., 2003; Cambridge et al.,
2004; Clarkson et al., 2004). As the scope of patient safety issues
within the healthcare system and the range of stakeholder groups
is large (Audit Commission, 2001; Department of Health, 2001 and
2004; National Patient Safety Agency, 2005) it was felt that
mapping workshops might enhance system design in the health
sector.
1.1. Origins of the workshop process design
The Design for Patient Safety (DPS) stakeholder workshops were
designed using experiential group work principles. These have
their origins in the work of the social psychologist Kurt Lewin and
his group relations training methodology called Training-groups
(or T-groups). Associates of Lewin (e.g. Bradford et al., 1964) who
were involved in the early experiments with T-groups in 1946,All rights reserved.described the methodology as follows: ‘‘A T-group is a relatively
unstructured group in which individuals participate as learners.
The data for learning are not outside these individuals or remote
from their immediate experience within the T-group. The data are
the transactions among members, their own behaviour in the
group, as they struggle to create a productive and viable organi-
sation, a miniature society, and as they work to stimulate and
support one another’s learning within that society.’’
One of the most important aspects of experiential group work is
the distinction between content and process. Miller (1989)
described the difference as follows:
‘‘The content of a group refers to what a group is doing, its tasks,
while the process refers to how the group task is achieved.’’
This distinction is central to the functioning of T-groups, espe-
cially those which have the objective of learning about group
processes. In such contexts, the process becomes the content. This
is wholly appropriate when participants have come together to
learn about group processes, or about their personal functioning in
a group setting. But, as this paper demonstrates, experiential group
work techniques can be used to explore other forms of content, in
this case patient safety in the NHS.
This application of experiential group work techniques to
innovation and design issues grew from thework of bothMiller and
Brown (e.g. Miller, 1989; Miller and Brown,1985). Miller and Brown
(1985) described the use of this approach in an event called the
Mini-economy. The purpose of the Mini-Economy event was to
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a time when, in 1985, there was mass unemployment and
economic recession. Participants from a broad cross-section of
society were recruited, ranging from unemployed people, to senior
managers in multinationals.
Subsequent applications of this approach have included an
investigation into the future of television broadcasting in the
UK (Brown, 1989), the regeneration of neighbourhoods in two
towns (Brown, 1996), and product innovation in workers’
co-operatives (Brown, 1997.) In each case a group of stakeholders
was engaged in an experiential event where a miniature society
was established to achieve a common objective. In these events
the role of the facilitators was to design and manage the process,
allowing the participants to focus on the content. The fact that
the facilitators had no expertise in the content meant that they
could focus on the process, which in turn enabled the groups to
make greater progress with the content. This approach formed
the basis for the DPS stakeholder workshops described in this
paper.
1.2. Relevance to medication errors
In the context of the DPS study, a major challenge was to
understand how stakeholders from across the National Health
Service (NHS) could become involved in the process of under-
standing and addressing design and patient safety issues within the
context of large and highly complex organisation. More speciﬁcally,
a focus on ‘medication errors and human factor issues’ was
identiﬁed as a priority for investigation. As one part of this studywe
decided to create (albeit for a relatively short space of time)
a miniature, self-reﬂecting society that could understand itself as
a representative sub-set of the entire system, and explore the
reality and consequences of interactions between elements of that
system.
There were two additional requirements of the stakeholder
engagement process. The ﬁrst requirement was to validate
elements of the desk research (see Cambridge, Surrey, RCA 2004),
in particular the mapping of the NHS system and the relationship/
interactions between major segments such as primary and
secondary care, the regulatory and manufacturing sectors, and
specialist services and professions. The second requirement was a)
to rapidly capture data on medication-related problems and errors
within a system where open reporting is not the norm, and b) to
understand, categorise and prioritise these adverse events with
regard to their actual and potential impact on patient safety and the
safety of the system as a whole.
2. Patient safety stakeholder workshops
A series of workshops was held to better understand the
challenges facing stakeholders across the healthcare industry, and
their priorities and concerns. The primary workshop objectives
were to:
1. Map the distribution and delivery of medication within the
healthcare system under study from a human factors
perspective.
2. Identify problems and sources of medication error.
3. Understand the system from the user perspective and its
potential for failure.
4. Find creative ‘solutions’ that were compatible with a human
factor’s systems approach to safety.
Medication error has been deﬁned in this study within
Cambridge, Surrey, RCA 2004.2.1. Overview
Four workshops were planned to meet these objectives. The
participants for these workshops and method used to conduct
them are described below.
Their duration and scope took account of the limited availability
of potential participants but nevertheless were considered to
provide coverage of an appropriate range of stakeholders across the
NHS. The ﬁrst two workshops were full-day, structured events.
They were organised for a cross-section of representatives from
primary and secondary care services, purchasing and licensing, and
equipment and pharmaceutical industries. In addition, a facilitated
two hour discussion group session was held with patient group
representatives. Finally a fourth, creative workshop was held with
a view to developing creative ‘solutions’ to the problems identiﬁed
through the earlier workshops.
The experiential group work (see below for the activities
conducted) offered a method for probing complex issues within
a large and fragmented system. This was achieved through the
conducting of the workshops that were combined with an integral
data collection mechanism. The latter took the form of the
accompanying workbooks and visual aids – maps, diagrams, illus-
trations and presentations. Thus, a core activity of the experiential
group work was the capturing of personal experiences and reﬂec-
tions in the workbooks, and then discussing, clustering and
prioritising these through group and plenary sessions to arrive at
a shared consensus around key issues, and to identify areas of
disagreement and contention. The workbooks were designed to be
physically ‘deconstructed’ over the duration of the workshop, and
to capture data in a way that preserved anonymity on the day and
for later publication, but allowed for thorough analysis of the
‘reconstructed’ workbooks after the event, using the forms-based
database: FileMaker Pro.
Such activities were also intended to serve the multiple
purposes of building a sense of community and co-operation in
tackling patient safety; to rapidly capture a substantial body of
data; identifying high risk ‘hotspots and design challenges’; to ﬂesh
out a mapping of the system to incorporate and reﬂect stakeholder
experience; and to begin to think about developing solutions
within the context of the larger system.
The data from the ﬁrst three sessions were analysed and used to
inform and focus the ﬁnal one-day ‘creative’ workshop. At this
creative workshop, the atmosphere was designed to be informal
and the event was structured along the lines of ‘user forums’ and
‘brainstorm’ sessions, both commonworking methods within user-
centred design research and practice. This encouraged a sense of
‘ownership’ of problems and challenges, and a genuine commit-
ment to ﬁnding solutions. Two research team members were
present but no other observers attended, in order to encourage
a relaxed and collaborative working atmosphere. Workshops were
professionally facilitated and were conducted under rules of
conﬁdentiality which participants were asked to sign, in order to
encourage openness and the sharing of information and
experience.
2.2. Participants
Participants were selected using a purposive sampling tech-
nique to ensure appropriate coverage of those roles and specialties
considered by the research team to be of most help in under-
standing the system. Participants were contacted directly through
a number of practice links. It is recognised that the sample might
therefore be subject to bias, particularly in that participants were
made aware that the focii of the workshops included identiﬁcation
of medication error. The participants at the ﬁrst two workshops
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care sectors (time of service ranged from 8 to 42 years, with an
average of 26.9 years) and 17 from procurement, licensing, and the
equipment and pharmaceutical industries (professional healthcare
related experience ranged from 3 to 45 years, with an average of
23.3 years). Some of the participants held very senior posts and had
a lifetime of experience of healthcare services, others were more
junior and had more day-to-day contact with patients. Collectively
the participants had almost 1000 years of experience, with a range
of 3–45 years and an average of 24 years. The patient group
comprised four representatives from patient support groups, with
the discussion led by the workshop facilitator.
The membership of the creative workshop brought together
a sub-set of nine participants from the ﬁrst threeworkshops, giving
a good spread across the stakeholder groups. There were two
industry representatives; the head of a large design group and
a product manager, who did not attend the earlier workshops; and
seven design professionals, ranging from current and recent Royal
College of Art (RCA) graduates to senior designers with experience
in a medical context and of major design implementation projects.
Between them the designers had over 140 years of experience,
ranging from 9 to 37 years, with an average of 24 years.2.3. Method for mapping the system
Each workshop began with a simpliﬁed map of the healthcare
system, produced by the research team, based on earlier desk-
based investigations.
Participants were asked to complete a short personal proﬁle,
give some detail on their reasons for attending, and position
themselves on the map. Additional elements of the system and
relationships were added to the map as requested by the workshop
participants.Fig. 1. The mappinThe map was based on concentric rings with the patient and
carer placed at the centre. In the ﬁrst ring, beginning at the top and
moving in a clockwise direction, were: hospital doctor; hospital
nurse; community pharmacy; off-the-shelf medication; care house
nurses; community nurses and general practitioners. In the next
ring were placed: purchasing; hospital pharmacy; ward-stock;
pathology and dispensing software. Finally, in the outer ring, were:
equipment suppliers; drug companies; trade associations; expert
opinion; distribution; government agencies, (including the Medical
Devices Agency andMedicines Control Agency that have since been
amalgamated, to form the Medicines and Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA).
Over the course of the two workshops and the patient groups
discussion session, the following were added (see Figs. 1 and 2) to
the inside ring: patient consent; patient support groups; care
providers; occupational therapists; alternative therapists; clinics, in
particular diabetes; consultants and emergency rescue and ﬁrst aid.
To the second ring were added: prescribing software; hospital
management; equipment training; investigation processes; the
hospital environment; and a differentiation was made between
purchasing of equipment and medicines. To the outside ring were
added: NHS agencies; trade unions and professional bodies; the
Internet; government; self-help groups; the research community;
device manufacturers; service providers; drug delivery design and
buying from drug companies on behalf of community pharmacies.
This generated the ﬁnal map. This map is best described as a ‘high
level’ description of the system. It is therefore of potentially limited
use for speciﬁc applications. However, as described in the following
section, it allowed for all participants to understand relationships
between individual system’s elements and this also aided their
discussions regarding potential failure modes.
However, it is important to recognize that the representatives in
the workshops did not cover all the roles subsequently identiﬁedg workshop.
Fig. 2. Development of map.
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healthcare and other related professionals might now be required
to conﬁrm the robustness and validity of the map and subsequent
capture of problems and sources of error.
2.4. Method for capturing problems and sources of error
The participants were asked to list actual and potential prob-
lems/errors and likely causes they were aware of or had direct
experience of, and attach markers to the map indicating where
these problems/errors were situated within the overall system,
thus identifying hotspots for medication error. (see Fig. 3)
After that, meeting in sector-speciﬁc groups, the participants
prioritised problems/errors, chose the top four problems from each
sub-group and presented these back to the full group. At this stage,
our earlier research as to potential sources of error based on the
contemporary literature were also presented to the full group and
marked on the system map. This provided the participants with an
opportunity to compare our literature research results with their
own, stakeholder, experience.
The participants then split into 2 cross-sector groups and
worked on identifying potential solutions and design opportunities
to the top eight problems/errors prioritised in the earlier session.
These were presented back to the full group in a plenary session,
and the workshops concluded with a feedback session that allowed
participants to reﬂect on the day.
2.5. Method for ﬁnding creative ‘solutions’
Key outcomes from the ﬁrst three workshops were taken to
a ’creative’ workshop, where designers, with experience of product
designing for the healthcare industry, were added to the stake-
holder mix. The system-wide nature of the prior workshops did notprovide the level of detailed information to underpin complete
design solutions. However, there was good reason to believe from
other research (O’Brien,1981;Wilson,1991)) that similar workshop
methods, combining data gathering with community creation, and
with a tighter focus, might facilitate requirements capture and
generate design solutions to advance patient safety within
a complex system such as the NHS.
This workshop was focused on a series of drawings of patient-
centred situations/environments that charted the patient journey
through the healthcare system, from the home, through the GP
surgery or rescue services, to entry to hospital, in-patient treatment
and outpatient return to community-based aftercare. The non-
designer participants identiﬁed and discussed issues and problems/
challenges in each situation.
The participants were then placed into three mixed groups of
two or three designers and three healthcare professionals, plus
industry representatives.
More detailed information andmini case studies emerged in the
team working sessions that were organised around three simple
briefs. Participants were asked to come up with 3 illustrated ideas/
scenarios to patient information/records, pack information/access,
or medical devices and drug administration. They were then asked
to select one idea to present in depth to the whole group. The team
leader introduced how the group approached the brief, where it
looked for solutions, and the non-preferred ideas, and another
person presented the selected idea. As the team leaders were all
designers, this ensured that both designers and non-designers
presented back to the assembled group. They worked on the briefs
for over two hours, and then presented their conclusions to the full
group.
The briefs were purposefully open to encourage maximum
sharing of information and discussion of issues, directions and
possible solutions. The teams were asked to come up with ideas
Fig. 3. Mapping sources of error.
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intention was to discover how well the process could work.
In normal circumstances, the designers would go on from such an
intensive user or ‘stakeholder’ forum to develop more speciﬁc and
in-depth solutions, which would then be tested and re-tested with
users as part of a process of homing in on and working up the detail
of ﬁnal proposals. Therewas not time to take the process through to
this stage, but in the context of a scoping study that was not
thought necessary. Discussion followed during which obstacles and
other factors were identiﬁed for each of the ‘solutions’.
3. Results
3.1. Mapping the system
In ﬁlling out themap of the system the participants added layers
of complexity, both in terms of stakeholder groups and the inter-
connections between them. What emerged was a system whose
intricacy surprised the participants and pointed to key underlying
problems related to fragmentation, parochialism, and lack of
communication and integration. The number and diversity of
interfaces between stakeholder groups created opportunities for
errors, in particular those associated with information transfer,
conﬂicts of interest, differing protocols and working practices and
conﬂicts of status and seniority. By positioning their problems on
the same map, key areas emerged, which helped to identify risky
situations and activities, and focus discussion around them.
Consensus was reached on some issues. These included that:
 The National Health Service (NHS) was considered to be
a fractured, complex organisation.
 Surprise was registered that the NHS is not more forceful in its
purchasing.
 It was felt that mistakes occurred under pressure, and that
pressure is endemic in the system.
 Blame culture was seen as a considerable obstacle to change.
 It was felt that there was considerable scope for collaboration
and standardisation across sectors. Concern was expressed over issues of information, packaging
and labelling.
 It was felt that the NHS needs to be innovative in tackling error
and patient safety, learn from other industries and take
a multidisciplinary approach to this.
However, sectoral differences emerged over other issues. For
example, those within primary and secondary care were more
aware of speciﬁc problems and instances as they experience them,
whereas those within industry, purchasing and licensing tended to
see the issues in terms of generalities.
Those closest to implementing or specifying solutions had least
contact with patients and ﬁrst hand experience of things going wrong,
while those closest to the problems, and patient contact, had the least
contact with design and designers. This indicates a considerable
opportunity for the capture and transfer of safety-relevant information
up the supply chain, and for designers, speciﬁers and purchasers to
learn from end users and those in direct contact with patients.
3.2. Capturing problems and sources of error
A signiﬁcant range and diversity of problems were captured
during the workshops, and awealth of detail exposed in discussion.
The problems could be grouped under the six major headings
(see Tables 1–6) of self-medication errors, prescription errors,
dispensing errors, administration errors, information and records
errors and equipment and devices.
As a result of identifying these problems, a number of major
challenges emerged.
a) Around the design of packaging – access to medication,
accompanying information, the separation of medication from
packaging and information, and correct identiﬁcation of pack/
contents.
b) Around patient information and records – drug charts, transfer
of records, separation of records from patients.
c) Around misadministration – device design itself, complexity,
variety of designs, confusion over correct use.
Table 1
Self-medication errors.
Problems Causes
1. Self-medication error Reading, understanding
P Medication taken inappropriately Cannot read or understand leaﬂet
inside package
S Wrong drug administration Age (deteriorating eyesight means
small letters hard to read); small
lettering on ampoules; poor contrast
on fonts; engraved/etched labelling
can be hard to read
P Patient unable to read labels Impaired vision; small print on
labels; poor durability of labels
I Patients confused by medication
names and/or appearance
Lack of standardisation
I Elderly patients unable to read
instruction on packs and/or
dispense medication from pack
Lack of consideration of ergonomics
issues related to older people.
P Patient error in frequency/
dosage of medication
Poor durability of computer printed
labels affects legibility. Deﬁcient
instructions by GP regarding
‘as required’ medication; removal of
tablets from original packs by
patients.
P&L Patient confusion: failure to
remove wrapper on
suppositories, muddling up
drugs; doses; timing
Older patients; poor labelling; poor
consulting; poly pharmacy;
dangerous combination of potent
drugs and low awareness patients.
Also administration by family
members acting as carers
P&L Removal of suppositories without
removing wrapping
Inadequate user information. P.I.L.
and package legibility
P Over-the-counter medication
‘not harmful’ often not seen as
medication
Lack of knowledge/awareness
I Non-compliance taking asthma
medication i.e. Seretide,
particularly under-dosing
Forgetfulness; patient knows best
(drug holidays); patient feels better;
education
P&L Inadequate dosing of respiratory
products via inhalers
Over-complex design þ operation
requirements
I Operating inhalers: co-ordination
(aerosols) and complex steps;
high forces for children and
inﬁrm; when to renew; ﬂow rates
Technical constraints; available
technology; cost constraints
I Accurately measuring liquid
formulations (at home)
Lack of suitable delivery systems;
unintentional misuse
P Patient doesn’t take medication
when given – pills found in the
bed, on the ﬂoor, etc.
Lack of supervision, patient non-
compliance, swallowing difﬁculties,
patient can’t handle dispensing
format
I Inaccuracy of drug delivery in
relation to diabetic insulin
delivery
Users not properly trained in
administration of product; non-
compliance due to patient error
P Inappropriate or inadequate
counselling of patient with regard
to taking/handling medication
Knowledge; communication
inadequacy; time resource;
environmental inadequacy
P Patient misunderstanding of
relationship/interaction between
prescribed and over-the-counter
medicines
Over-the-counter (OTC) medicines
often not perceived as potent
2. Self-medication error Storage, confusion, complicated
regimes
P Reuse of insulin needles leads to
hypo-dystrophy and/or needle
breakage
Saving money
P Inappropriate storage in home Lack of knowledge by patient
P Storage of medicines in patient’s
homes; child access
Packaging design
P Storage of medicines in patient’s
homes; temperature control
Poor instructions
P People having lots of different
bottles of medication – out of
date/current/not relevant – can
take wrong one
People keep old medication, don’t
throw it away
Table 1 (continued )
Problems Causes
I Elderly confused patients with
several drugs failing to adhere to
medication instructions
Forgetfulness; too much confusing
information; too many decisions;
poor/no aids to assist with correct
and timely dispensing
P Identiﬁcation of drugs (taken in
overdose)
Drug names printed on the reverse
of blister packs are not readable
once the tablet is removed; drug
packs hoarded by patient
P&L Patient self medicating, takes
wrong drug from a number
prescribed
Patient doesn’t know what drugs
are for, cant read label, removes
blister from carton
P&L Patient takes same drug more
than once
Brands plus generic version
available but patient doesn’t realise
they are the same and takes both
I Patients failing to comply with
prescribed treatment due to too
many medicines to remember
Complicated drug regimes causing
confusion/error; variety of
packaging/poor quality
labels/instructions;
3. Self-medication error Access and packaging
P Access to packs and bottles Not getting the balance right
between impaired/elderly
requirements and child safety
P Patients unable to manage
packaging
Elderly; muscular/skeletal;
psychological/confusion; poor pack
design; prescriber unaware of user
needs/pack types
P Older and arthritic patients
unable to open packaging –
container or blister strip
split off
General Practitioner (GP) systems
ordering non pack size (30 when
comes in 28). Rules say if not a
calendar pack (no day/week on foil)
the exact quantity should be
supplied, hence odd 2 tablets
supplied, difﬁcult to manipulate
P Older people will get a third
party to open packaging and
leave open – can’t open
‘child proof’ tops so leave off.
May lead to deterioration of
contents
Manufacturers reluctance to think
of new ways of packaging
4. Self-medication error Information, knowledge
P Patient/carer lack of knowledge
leads to errors in managing
medication in community – take
too much, too little, wrong time or
combination
Lack of awareness/understanding
by presenter; unreadable
information in packaging
P Incompatible or contrary
information supplied to patient by
healthcare professional – GP,
Pharmacist, nurse, Internet,
relative
Poor communications
P Care provider not understanding
about the medicines they are
supervising/assisting in
administering
Lack of training/information sharing
Note: For Tables 1–7 the following key indicates which stakeholder group raised
each problem. (P ¼ primary care; S ¼ secondary care; P&L ¼ purchasing and
licensing; I ¼ industry).
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The problem appeared to break down into complex interactions
between risky situations, riskymoments, risky itemsand riskyusers.
Key areas or ‘accident hotspots’ were identiﬁed. These included:
 In the home, around problems associated with packaging,
storage, remembering, reading, understanding, etc.
 In transfer/transit around changes in drugs, protocols, people,
equipment, records, etc.
 Around the hospital bed and infusion lines, connectors, notes
and record keeping, communication between staff, drug
administration procedures, etc.
Table 2
Prescription errors.
1. Prescription error Wrong drug
P&L Prescription error Human failure; system failure:
wrong prescription or patient or
record interrogated; 2 doses to one
patient
I Poor handwriting/transcription
errors/illegibility
Lack of awareness of risk hazards;
poor investment in Information
Technology (IT)
P Wrong patient gets script
P Prescribing drugs outside
normal experience
P Incorrect prescription because
of confusion of generic names
Generic names often less clear than
brand names; similarity of generic
names of very different medications;
computer ‘pick lists’ problems for
prescriber
P Misprescribing of drugs with
similar names
Partly the regulatory agencies,
especially with co-names
P Ignoring decision support e.g.
prescribing software etc
Information is available but not used
2. Prescription error Communication, follow-up
P Inappropriate information from
drug company reps etc.
GPs using reps for education
P Errors in communication with
patients (by GPs and
pharmacists e.g. on how to take
inhalants)
Lack of appreciation that it is a
problem
P Interactions with over-the-counter
products
Poor history taking by GPs
P Audit trail for controlled drugs
(once they have reached
the patient)
Drugs left in patients possession
are ‘owned’ by patient; no formal
route for disposal
Table 3
Dispensing errors.
1. Dispensing error Wrong drug
P&L Wrong drug dispensed Label not read correctly by healthcare
practitioner (HCP); similarity in
packaging; busy pharmacy; poorly
written prescriptions
P Dispensers/pharmacists
dispensing wrong medication
pack
Design of packs conforming to
manufacturers corporate identity
despite different medications,
dosage, strength; similar generic
names causing confusion
P Wrong medication/strength
supplied against GP/dental
prescription
Process control; pack design/clarity
S Wrong drug given in error Identical packaging by drug
company of different drugs;
Pharmacy stock constantly
changing supplier
P Mis-pick medicine Similar pack; word shape; similarity
of drug name; distraction
P&L Dispensing/administration error Poor medicine labelling; poor pack
design
S Inconsistent colour/packaging
of medication
Lack of direction centrally; importing
I Incorrect product selection by
nurse/pharmacist prior to
administration
Similarity of labelling/packaging;
lack of training/awareness
S Pack selection; All along the
supply chain
Design of packaging; shelving for
storage
I Sound-alike and look-alike
names of medicines causing
incorrect product selection
Difﬁculty in ﬁnding unique
nomenclature
P Confusion of drug identity with
multiple names for the same drug
Lack of clarity if the actual drug
name on some packages – some
very similar names used to identify
different drugs
2. Dispensing error Speciﬁc confusions
P Norton/Ivax – Atenolol 100 mg
prescribed for blood pressure;
Azathioprine 50 mg supplied
(an immunosuppressant)
Manufacturers pack design – same
colour, size box, sit next to each
other in continental drawer system –
typeface size where label applied is
small – both white tablets so patient
takes one before noticing difference
P Prochloperazine 5 mg on
prescription, Procyclidine 5 mg
supplied
Norton/Ivax packaging is same
colour, size, font and lie next to
each other; corporate colour coding
scheme focused on brand identity
rather than product identity, colour
now changed
P Wrong proﬁled insulin pen given
to/used by patient – 42 fast as
opposed to 42 basal
Poor information on script; GP not
giving enough information;
pharmacist not asking; patient not
realising difference
P Tegretol anti-epileptic drugs – all
forms and strengths have same
coloured boxes
Manufacturer, and all their other
products are in the same coloured
packages
3. Dispensing error Mislabelling
P&L Dispensing errors: incorrect
selection; incorrect labelling;
incorrect supply
Human failure; confusion: not
reading label; misreading; choosing
by sight (colour coding)
P Mis-labelled medicine Knowledge; Distraction; Label
system shortcomings
P Dispensing Medications in the
community; mislabelling by
pharmacy/dispensing doctor
Process control
4. Dispensing error Stock control
P Stock control, out of date drugs Short shelf life of some products
P Out of date ﬂuids given – saline,
dextrose
Staff under pressure have not
carried out proper safety checks.
Most ﬂuid bags look the same,
dates on ﬂuids in small font not
distinctive
(continued on next page)
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unfamiliar, and when people are working under pressure.
 Where information becomes ‘non-sticky’ and gets detached
from patients, packaging, medication, or ineffectively or
incompletely transferred, e.g. to pharmacists.
 In cases ofmistaken identity related to names, packs, connectors,
ampoules, infusion pumps, non-standard equipment and so on.
 In failures to effectively capture errors or information that is
design-relevant.
 Where problems and causes are confused and conﬂated,
especially around non-compliance and there is a tendency to
blame – the patient or the manufacturer or the doctor or carer,
rather than unravel the complex, interrelated chain of causes
and resulting problems.
 Solving the major pack-associated problems for older people in
their homes may also solve similar problems for other groups.
 Tackling the major problems for hospital staff and paramedics,
associated with identifying medications once they are sepa-
rated from their packs may solve similar problems for other
less critical groups.
3.4. Finding creative ‘solutions’
The generic issues and situations that had emerged from the
previous workshop were fed back to the ‘creative’ workshop
participants as a stimulus for the day.
One place to look for solutions is to identify common problems
that occur in different forms and in different situations, and then
select ‘critical’ users to work with (i.e. those most likely to experi-
ence or be associated with the more severe or extreme expressions
of the problem.)
The capture method used at the creative workshop proved
highly effective in terms of eliciting speciﬁc and detailed informa-
tion about how and why problems occur at different locations. To
facilitate this process a large drawing of the patient journey/
Table 3 (continued)
5. Dispensing error Incorrect supply to pharmacy
P Wrong supply to pharmacy
P Amiodarone 200 g supplied by
wholesaler (anti-arrhythmic for
heart) Trimethoprin 200 g
ordered (antibiotic)
Packaging same colour;
manufacturers packaging designs
identical and same strength. Only
drug name differs; untrained staff
and language problems loading
automatic A-frame system
P Availability of some drugs,
changes in packaging and
presentation
Supply and distribution
6. Dispensing error Clinical trials
S Dispensing of active medication
for a clinical trial when placebo
medication called for
Trial design; unfamiliarity; out of
hours; trial supplies
Table 4
Administration errors.
1. Administration error Wrong dose/dilution
P Uncertainty of drug doses,
especially in paediatrics
Different methods of calculating
doses – age, size, weight –
adult/child vary according to drug
P Use of paediatric drugs in
pre-hospital care – ambulance
paramedics
Environment is stressful, only two
staff to complete multiple tasks,
time constraints; draw up exact
amounts of drugs
S Error of drug dilution in
paediatrics
Paediatric doses
S Error in dose prescription and
failure to identify this, resulting
in incorrect drug being
administered to child
Volume of workload/dependency
of sick children on the drug
P Standard doses for adults given
to elderly people – with different
rates of drug
metabolism/absorption.
2. Administration error Misinterpretation, confusion
P Misread prescription – dose drug,
etc.
Knowledge, training; distraction,
personal issue; unclear direction,
illegibility
P&L Dispensing errors (personal);
incorrect administration –
solution, dose, rate of
administration
Poor labelling; not reading labels;
human error, prescription error
S Misreading of decimal point on
prescription – nurse gives
too much drug
S Confusion and delays in giving
emergency drugs
Change of name - adrenaline to
epinephrine; staff too often
unfamiliar with description of
concentration e.g. 1:1000 etc.
P&L Medication errors caused by
‘human factors’ e.g. ﬁxation,
routine, stress, poor processes
Lack of awareness; low levels of
education/training; cultural issues –
‘way we do things round here’; poor
standardisation; multiple variety in
applications
S Drugs wrongly prepared
(concentrations)
Difﬁcult to ﬁnd preparation
information and no info about
how long to give drugs over;
‘Information for patients’ included in
drug packaging is often inappropriate
and does not include practical
instructions.
S Wrong drug  wrong dose Illegible prescription
S Miscalculation of prescribed dose Problems re interpretation of
prescribing information and local
documents/charts
P&L Administration error Confusion around colour coding;
poor labelling; small print; can’t read
in dark; similar drug names; mcg
confused with mg; confusion over
measures/ratios: 1:1000, 0.1%,
1 mg/ml
P Having to dilute drugs in the ﬁeld
increases risk of error
Some drugs supplied in dried or
concentrated form needing dilution
with saline or water
P Supply quantity is larger than
normally carried on an
ambulance/by a paramedic
meaning drugs are often
removed from a box and even
put into other drug boxes
Supply quantity does not relate to
normal pre-hospital doses
I Medicines being separated from
their original
containers/packaging prior to use
Convenience/speed; poor
design/storage facilities/packaging
3. Administration error Information/communication
S Nurse takes verbal instruction
from doctor – incorrect
medication given
Availability of doctor; agreement by
nurse
S Failure to give prescribed drug
by nursing staff
Pressure of wards; prescription
charts; organisation of one-off
medication
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‘site-speciﬁc’ issues. Participants were open and very forthcoming,
and the atmosphere of the groupwas one of collective participation
and involvement.
Over 90 issues were gathered in little more than an hour of
extensive and focused discussion, giving useful detail in relation to:
care at home involving GP, community nurse etc.; the local phar-
macy; the surgery and day-care centre; the rescue services;
entering hospital; the operating theatre; intensive care; the ward;
and patient aftercare. Examples of output are included in Table 8
(For full details see Cambridge, Surrey, RCA, 2004).
3.4.1. Solution spaces
Typically, after quite lengthy general discussion to establish
a focus and priorities, the teams moved onto discussing very
speciﬁc and in-depth problems. There was a strong sense of
ownership of these by individuals and a practical desire to reach
combined solutions tomore than one problem. In several instances,
such detailed information pointed to design solutions, for example:
 Paramedics repack ampoules in a handy (mixed) format using
existing larger quantity packs – there was therefore scope for
smaller volume supply or special containers designed for
paramedics that give better visibility and identiﬁcation.
 Information fails to transfer properly from one environment to
another, for instance: ambulance drug records are handwritten
under pressure and using abbreviations/codes and are there-
fore often mistranscribed – scope for the use of ‘peelable’
barcodes in the recording of drug information in many situa-
tions including the home. These could be peeled off from
medication packaging, or from a sheet and stuck to the patient
record, allowing for accurate, swift and keyless transcription to
computerised records.
 Patients, paramedics and other carers are often unaware of
what medications are for – there was therefore scope to add
this information to prescriptions and labels on dispensed
drugs, as an aid to identiﬁcation and a way of better informing
patients, to be pointed out to patients at the pharmacy.
 Pharmacists who remember dispensing drugs from large
quantity containers and counting tablets pointed out the extent
towhich theywere other cues available to them that helped aid
identiﬁcation. For example, the smell of different drugs, their
appearance, the feel of them to the ﬁngers, the sound they
made when poured out on the counter, the dust they produced
and other factors provided near-subliminal information/
conﬁrmation as to the identity of the medication.With modern
packaging, not only were these subtle clues no longer available
to the pharmacist, but the similarity and the proliferation of
Table 4 (continued)
S Miscalculation of drug to be
administered from a correct
prescription
Inexperienced staff; staff in
unfamiliar working environment
S Incorrect drug dispensed to
patient
Unable to read prescription;
not checking drug with patient
P Hand medicine to wrong patient Distraction; patient reaction;
violation of procedures or
inadequate procedures
S Drug prescribed but wrong drug
given to wrong patient
Illegible handwriting; incorrect
checking of drug chart
S Nurse fails to check patient
name, patient confused and
conﬁrms (mishears) name –
given drug intended for another
patient
4. Administration error Methotrexate
P&L Methotrexate intended for weekly
dosing, but patient takes it daily
Lack of knowledge on the part of
HCP about use of Methotrexate;
lack of information to patient about
how drug should be used
S Oral weekly Methotrexate given
daily
Labelling, training, packaging,
knowledge (lack of)
5. Administration error Route
P&L Administration error:
rate; route
Poor training/ignorance; pump used
incorrectly; injection intravenously
not intrathecally and vice versa;
confusion – mis-supply of product
and/or not reading label
P Incorrect route of administration
in emergency (resuscitation
usually) situation or incorrect
dosage
Ampoules difﬁcult to read – shiny
small print on shiny glass ampoules –
especially in emergency situation.
Complexity and small print of data
sheets
S Drug delivered by incorrect route
(intrathecally rather than
intravenously)
Pre-prepared drugs not labelled
S Intravenous (IV) administration of
drugs intended for another route
Prepared infusion in solution bag
virtually identical to normal
intravenous solution
I Poor process control –
inexperienced staff being put
into situations of risk (to
patients) e.g. cytotoxic
chemotherapy administration/
spinal procedures by junior
hospital doctors
Cultural; availability of personnel;
lack of perceived risk
S Vincristine (chemotherapy agent)
wrongly given intrathecally
instead of intravenously.
Patient dies.
Many (extensive report published);
Doctors in hospital are a surprisingly
unregulated group in terms of strict
working practices
S Vincristine administered
intrathecally
Connection standards; unfamiliarity;
accreditation
S Administration of potent
anticancer drugs (Vinca
alkaloids) into central
nervous system instead of
intravenously
Failure to check medication
carefully; staff exceeding their
training and responsibilities;
Interchangeable connectors
P&L Accidental intrathecal injection
of Vincristine
Multiple, but the ability to connect
‘Luer ‘ syringe to cerebro-spinal ﬂuid
(CSF) access devices is one. If this
were impossible this error couldn’t
happen
P&L Misconnection of medical devices
resulting in inappropriate
administration of drugs, or failure
to deliver drugs
Widespread use of ‘Luer’
connectors on a wide range of
medical devices
6. Administration error Rate/connection
P&L Mistake in administration of
infused drug and/or user error in
setting up or use of equipment –
generic problem often with no
clear cause
Technology seen as secondary to
answering patient requirements.
Busy, stressed clinical staff;
inadequate training in use of
equipment
P&L Misuse/abuse of e.g. infusion
devices, syringe drivers
Poor labelling of equipment; poor
design of control panels; poor
instruction manuals
Table 4 (continued)
P&L Inappropriate drug delivery rates
when using infusion pumps and
similar devices. Results in
over/under infusion
Complexity of current devices;
variety of types/makes/models;
poorly understood by users;
user training
P&L Lack of standardisation of
devices – wide variety available –
potential for staff to use
unfamiliar devices
I Incorrect administration of
medicines due to lack of
understanding of equipment
e.g. syringe drivers/pumps
Lack of training; inexperienced staff;
complicated design features
P&L Drug administration errors due to
incorrect interpretation of
instructions and wrong device
connected
Incorrect interpretation of
instructions; potential for different
types of medical devices to be
connected allowing inappropriate
drug delivery
7. Administration error Misconnection/delivery
S Interruption in life-sustaining drug
infusion
The design of syringe drivers, some
reduce rate of delivery towards the
end of the infusion; insigniﬁcant
alarm noises - should alert nurses
to nearing completion of infusion –
some sound like feed pumps.
S Syringe becoming detached from
syringe driver. Delivery of
incorrect dose
Poor design
P&L Plunger of pre-ﬁlled syringe falls
out as syringe is connected to
intravenous cannula
Human failure – poor technique;
lack of familiarity in use of glass
syringes
I Patient ‘plays’ with drug delivery
device, resulting in drug build-up
and subsequent overdose
Non compliant patient – no effective
design response
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increasingly difﬁcult for pharmacists to correctly identify
drugs. There is scope here for various design approaches,
ranging from adding back visual and tactile cues to packaging
to obliging manufacturers to add an additional warning indi-
cator to packs that are regularly mistaken. Barcodes could also
be used to address this issue, and the adding of information
about what the prescription is for could help conﬁrm the
choice of medication in the pharmacy.
This process led to practical ideas for solutions, which included:
 A patient information system building on patient/doctor
interaction and the recording of what their medication was
prescribed for, as an aid to communication between e.g.,
patients and pharmacists;
 A national patient/drug information system that would give
correct information and encourage trust between patient and
prescriber/carer;
 Simple redesigns of line connectors to eliminate incorrect
connections;
 A customised individual drug administration/packaging
system to aid medication compliance, particularly for compli-
cated regimes;
 Improved pack designs to keep information with medication,
both inside and outside the pack, and to facilitate identiﬁcation
of drugs and their use;
 A simpliﬁed drug recognition/information system tailored to
different users, e.g. patients; community carers and hospital
nurses in the ward and in intensive care;
 Ways in which ‘peelable’ barcodes could be used to update
patient records both in stressful situations like rescue, and in
the ward and the home; and
 Ways in which smartcards can be used in hospitals, by para-
medics and in the home, to check, monitor and reassure.
Table 5
Information and records.
1. Information and records Continuity between sectors
P Continuity of care Not all drugs are available in all
places, meaning that a patient is
moved from one location to another.
Often a suitable range of medication
is not available in care homes. Only
a list of drugs, or their prescription
chart may travel with a patient.
S Inadequate information ﬂows
regarding errors/near misses
Nationally: lack of co-ordinated
system (that being piloted has
changed direction and looks to
become less effective than desired);
locally: poor or poorly used
systems, poor feedback,
inappropriate management
responses
S Poor secondary/primary care
communication re medication
monitoring
Poor recording/transmission in the
NHS; inadequate emphasis in
medical training; shortage of staff
e.g. clerical; inadequate use of
modern technology
P Different drug protocols used by
different care
providers/ambulance services –
‘postcode care’
Local paramedic steering committee
2. Information and records Drug charts
S Medications not clearly
prescribed on drug charts.
Allergy box not completed
Doctors under heavy workload
pressure
S Nurse fails to record drug as
given on drug chart – another
nurse assumes drug not given
and gives further dose
Work pressure; lack of compliance
with protocol
3. Information and records Checking in wards
S Nurse and checker doing drug
round with controlled drug –
checker called away by another
patient – other nurse continues,
gives wrong patient drug
Work pressures; distraction;
non-compliance with protocol
S Nurses (usually) have a 2nd
person check drugs –
dose/expiry date etc. Doctors
don’t. Generally they are subject
to less regulated practice than
nurses.
Long-standing cultural differences
of the domain of nursing and
medicine. Arrogance of some
doctors
S Nurse tells doctor that he/she has
prescribed wrong drug (usually
junior doctor and senior nurse).
Doctor ignores expertise and
knowledge of nurse
Culture, hierarchical relationship;
individual personality
Table 6
Equipment and devices.
1. Equipment and devices Sharps related incidents
P Needlestick injuries from used
intravenous cannulae or lancets
Administration of
intravenous/intramuscular drugs in
sub-optimal environments; cost of
‘needle safe’ devices
P&L Sharps injuries to medical staff Inappropriate disposal of used
syringes, needles, etc.
‘re-sheathing’ syringes
P&L Disposal of sharps used in
medication delivery – problems
created by injuries to staff and
patients
Improper disposal of sharps after
use, and injuries from accidents
while sharps are in use
2. Equipment and devices Confusion, mistaken identity
S Nurse hands syringe to colleague
to give injection – colleague
thinks it is a clear ﬂuid, in fact
syringe empty
Attention/distraction; failure to check
S A&E department, minor
procedure taking place. Nurse
hands doctor 5 ml syringe that
he/she thinks is saline and is
in fact Lignocaine. Doctor injects,
the patient is ﬁne but could have
had cardiac arrest
Poor communication; poor labelling
of syringes/equipment; lack of
protocols
S Antimicrobials diluted with KCl
instead NaCl
KCl kept in same place as NaCl;
ampoules look/feel similar;
writing small
P&L Lignocaine selected for ﬂush
rather than saline/water in
theatres
Similarity of packaging; poor
storage of drugs – small containers
outside fully labelled packaging;
poor lighting; emergency situation,
rapid response required
S Giving the wrong drug on
occasion to a patient
Picking up the wrong syringe and
failing to check the label properly.
It is part of an automatic process, and
if distracted it is easy to do, with
multiple syringes in use.
S Busy junior ward doctors being
the only people eligible to give
intravenously. Being in a hurry,
giving the wrong drug to the
wrong patient
Not enough time; not enough care;
lack of protocols; over reliance on
1 person to give all IV (Intravenous)
S Over-pressured doctors with
inadequate knowledge of
individual patients
Increased pressure/turnover;
decreased junior doctor hours –
often compounded by transient
nursing staff
3. Equipment and devices Over infusion
S Over infusion of drugs Using incorrect infusion device,
one that infuses over 1 hour
instead of 24
4. Equipment and devices Gases
P&L Traumatic patient injury arising
from inappropriate delivery of
medical gases
Equipment poorly understood
by users; poor manufacturer
instructions; inadequate training
S Nitrous oxide given, not oxygen –
death of child
Confusing equipment, doctor error
5. Equipment and devices Peculiar to anaesthesia
S potential for contamination
(accidental or deliberate) of
volatile anaesthetic agents
At least two of the volatiles come in
screw-top bottles and could be
contaminated. Most of the
vaporisers have a ‘key-ﬁller’ system
to prevent misﬁling of a vaporiser,
but on one of the newest vaporisers
the system can be by-passed
6. Equipment and devices Insufﬁcient differentiation
I Drug companies are turning to
proprietary delivery systems to
differentiate their products in the
market. This means that the
patient may have a range of
drugs in very similar
containers/systems
Insufﬁcient differentiation of drug
delivery systems due to: costs of
retooling to differentiate drugs by
design solutions, inventory costs,
timescales and costs to evaluate
system
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allotted to the workshop, none of these solutions were explored in
depth, and the participants themselves rapidly came up with
challenges and further issues. The solutions are not therefore
proposed as viable as they stand, but the potential effectiveness of
the process was well demonstrated.
One major obstacle encountered at the creative workshop was
the lack of speciﬁc knowledge. Although the participants had no
difﬁculty in outlining possibleways inwhich the problemsmight be
tackled, they hit a barrier in arriving at solutions because of a lack of
knowledge about the system itself, and how elements of it interact.
4. Discussion
4.1. Stakeholder involvement
The fact that a cross-section of stakeholders could be brought
together at very short notice and with an attendance rate in excess
of 90% demonstrates a signiﬁcant degree of commitment to
Table 7
Key problems/errors and causes.
Key problems/errors Causes
P Similarity of names and packs Confusion; lack of differentiating
features; working under pressure;
the way medications are stored:
in pharmacies, on wards, in the home
P Communication including
language and non-verbal
Assumptions; working under
pressure; stafﬁng changes; native
language and cultural factors;
hierarchical culture in NHS;
misinformation
P Information provision is quirky,
not systematic
Commercial inﬂuence; no central
system or single accredited source
of information; variations between
suppliers; information leaﬂets
protect against litigation rather than
provide the right information
inappropriate forms for different
users
P Physical access to the contained
medications by professionals
and users/carers
Pack design; patient ability;
conﬂicts with child and tamper
resistance; prompts repackaging of
drugs; problems with blister packs
S Drug identiﬁcation – difﬁculty
of ensuring use of
correct drug.
Highlighted by Vincristine,
in particular due to severity of
outcome in the event of
misadministration, but also occurs
in the case of tablets and
ampoules. Causes include:
similarity of packaging;
repackaging; use of colours;
renaming of brands; changes of
medication name e.g. adrenaline
now ephedrine; label size and
legibility; using drugs in
difﬁcult/stressful situations
S Lack of/inaccessibility of
systematic information about
causes that can be used
to inform solutions.
Contingent workforce – temporary
staff; structure of nursing and
medical workforce; staff shortages –
changing hours;
frequency/severity of disciplinary
action; fear of litigation; complex
reporting systems; failure to share
information
S Administration of drug by
wrong route
Equipment; variation/lack of
variation; wrong route ‘selected’ by
giver; warning systems; individual
‘initiative’ (purchasing adapters);
human error; poor communication;
reporting feedback mechanisms
S Repetitive error in drug
administration.
Prescription charts – legibility;
environment – distractions; failure
to follow protocols; poor verbal
communication; poor record
keeping; role of ‘checker’; lack of
error reporting (blame culture);
stafﬁng – experience, temporary,
skill mix; cultural aspects –
dr./nurse relationship; human error
P&L Packaging. labelling,
presentation, recognition.
Differentiation
Size/shape; lack of speciﬁcation
and testing against it; commercial
pressure; poor labelling, esp.
legibility; incorrect interpretation of
instructions
P&L Inadequate understanding of
how to use device. And lack
of understanding of
information about abuse.
Design; complexity of devices;
variety of makes and models;
supporting information or lack of it;
human factors; lack of training;
poorly designed documents
P&L Environmentally aware design
solutions (lack of); taking the
demands of working situations
and stresses into account as
part of the design challenge.
Lack of collaborative working þ
joined up thinking; distance
between industry and designers
and the actual care environment;
industry’s need for differentiation;
tendency to look for accuracy
rather than suitability for purpose
as easier to quantify.
Table 7 (continued)
Key problems/errors Causes
P&L Awareness of secondary risks of
e.g. sharps, medical gases,
administration, equipment
Lack of training; lack of risk-
awareness; over-complexity of
safety systems
I Noncompliant
patient/carer/physician
Patient: reluctance to take
medication; confusion;
forgetfulness; supervision;
carer/physician: training;
inappropriate expertise;
administration
I Confusion between medications Delivery systems not differentiated;
similar packs/labels; similar names;
elderly confused patients
I Information ﬂow – lack of Records not with patient – main
problem; incorrect modality
prescribed; poor handwriting
I Users override design safety
features
Patient plays with device;
paramedics in emergency
situations; medication separated
from pack; cannot understand
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the many sectors of the UK healthcare system. However, this was
a small, self-selected group and therefore subject to potential
sampling and other biases. The stakeholders participating had
a wealth of detailed experience which throws fresh light on how
and why errors occur. They were keen to improve practice and
patient safety in their speciﬁc ﬁelds and have had much to
contribute to the process. Overall, there is a real potential for the
successful and cost-effective engagement of stakeholders in the
process of error reduction and improving patient safety, and
a willingness among the stakeholders to be part of that process.
Small groups of designers and stakeholders working together in an
informal setting can rapidly identify and explore problems and
move towards solutions. However, more detailed information is
required if solutions are to be effective and actually improve patient
safety.4.2. Problem identiﬁcation
A wealth of anecdotal detail on aspects of medication error,
especially in the community, emerged from creative, primary,
secondary and patient support group sessions. The patient group
identiﬁed a range of issues, from support (or lack of it) to medica-
tion delivery by carers, through information ﬂow, checking of
medication, especially on transfer from one sector or care envi-
ronment to another, to the need for patients to take ownership of
their health conditions and treatments. In general it was thoughtTable 8
Issues at the local pharmacy.
Negative issues
 People are reluctant to take medicine due to stigma, etc.;
 There are problems associated with effectively communicating with
patients;
 There is inconsistency between individual pharmacists;
 Patients can chose to go to any pharmacy and so errors occur and
patients are confused by differing presentations of medications;
 Presentation forms change frequently even if the patient goes to the
same pharmacist;
 Changes also occur to brand, trade and ofﬁcial names of medications; and
 Self-medication problems occur incorrect dosing with eye or nose
dropper - very difﬁcult/impossible to get it right.
Positive issues
 Pharmacists act as a checking process (though this is impeded);
 Pharmacists share information between pharmacies from different chains;
 Pharmacists are undervalued but often visited ﬁrst in the case of illness.
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human error versus culture and practices arose in all workshops.
There was particular emphasis on variations in protocols between
providers/services/sectors; confusions about responsibility;
stressful situations; hierarchical and autocratic behaviour; and
conﬂicts of interests between industry and healthcare system.
Many interrelated factors contribute to the major instances of
error, and these occur in many variations with there being no clear
cut differentiation between problems and causes. This reﬂects the
complexity of the overall problem, and the varying experiences and
perceptions of different stakeholder groups. However, the stake-
holder workshops were highly successful in identifying a broad
range of issues and understanding the details behind them.
It would be interesting in future research to compare this
approach with more traditional methods of identifying errors
(see for example, Carayon, 2007).
4.3. Robustness of workshop outputs
The categories of user problems identiﬁed in Tables 1–7 were
subsequently compared with results from a separate review of the
literature (see Cambridge, Surrey, RCA, 2004). The comparison
seemed to conﬁrm that direct consultation with stakeholders is
a rapid, effective and robust way of identifying problems and errors.
4.4. Creative solutions
The creative workshop generated many issues centred around
speciﬁc healthcare environments. While covering the same terri-
tory as other workshops, these results are much richer from
a design perspective, giving speciﬁc details of actual incidences,
contexts and practices, with further depth of information emerging
in the group working sessions. From a design perspective the
richness of detail and the range of viewpoints and contexts
described were both interesting and valuable. As a process, similarstakeholder workshops could help designers better understand the
complexity and range of factors to be taken into account.References
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